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STEVEN GARD*
I. INTRODUCTION

Because of the complexities of the law and the pressures of being
faced with prosecution the Supreme Court has long been aware of the
need which defendants in criminal cases have for counsel to represent
them.' The Court has, in fact, recognized the right of an accused to such
counsel 2-a right which is derived directly from the Constitution. This
article will examine the level of representation required by the Constitution and will discuss the various suggestions which have been made to
improve the quality of representation received by criminal defendants.
The Constitution declares that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . .. to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense." 3 The notion that the Constitution requires something beyond
the mere presence of an attorney at the defense table was not established,
however, until the Supreme Court decided Powell v. Alabama4 in 1932.
In that case seven young black men were charged with the rape of two
young white women in a freight car moving through Alabama. A sheriff's
posse seized the men off the train and took them to Scottsboro, the county
seat. Because of hostile community feelings, it was necessary for the state
militia to guard the prisoners and to escort them to and from the courthouse. At the defendants' arraignment the judge appointed all members
of the county bar to defend them. When the case came to trial six days
later, the only attorney present at the defense table was an out-of-state
lawyer who stated that "he had not been employed, but that people who
were interested had spoken to him about the case." 5 The defendants were
found guilty and each was sentenced to death. Their appeals were dis"Associate, Amelung, Wulff, Willenbrock, St. Louis, Missouri; Member,
Missouri Bar; A.B., University of Michigan, 1972; J.D., Washington University, 1976.
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. Id. at 53.
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missed by the Alabama Supreme Court with the Chief Justice dissenting.6 The United States Supreme Court ruled that, on the facts as presented, the defendants had been denied their right to the effective aid
of counsel as required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that the mere appointment of counsel for the
accused, without more, was a violation of the defendants' due process
rights and that "such designation of counsel as was attempted was either
so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid in that regard." 7 The Court later added:
[I]t is the duty of the Court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and
that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or
under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid
in the preparation and trial of the case.8
Such were the humble beginnings of what has been termed "the
emerging fair trial issue for the Seventies."D It is not surprising that some
courts had difficulty discerning a broad rule of law from the subtle language of Powell. In Mitchell v. United States'0 the court held that Powell
only required the effective appointment of counsel. It stated that the
Supreme Court in Powell "has not itself undertaken, nor has it imposed
upon the inferior federal courts, the duty of appraising the quality of a
defense."" This decision, and others like it,12 appears to be inconsistent
with both the plain meaning of the previously quoted language and
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. For example, in Avery v.
Alabama'3 the Court held that the Constitution's guarantee of assistance
of counsel cannot be satisfied by a mere formal appointment. In White
v. Ragen' 4 the Court held that if the petitioner could show that the state
had forced him to trial "with such expedition as to deprive him of the
effective aid and assistance of counsel," he would be entitled to habeas
corpus relief. Glasser v. United States'15 not only restated this proposition
but further tied the right to effective assistance of counsel to the sixth
amendment as well as to the fourteenth. In that case the Court held that
the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
appointed attorney also represented a co-defendant in the case whose in6. Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 141 So. 201 (1932).
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
8. Id. at 71.
9. Flynn, Adequacy of Counsel: The Emerging Fair Trial Issue for the
Seventies?, 14 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19 (1975).
10. 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958),
11. Id. at 790.
12. Hester v. United States, 303 F.2d 47 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 847 (1962); Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949); Diggs v.
Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945); see also
Comment, Effective Representation-An Evasive Substantive Notion Masquerad.
ing as Procedure,39 WAsH. L. Ruv. 819 (1964).
13. 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
14. 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945).
15. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/1

2

Gard: Gard: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel--Standards and Remedies
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

1976]

terests were adverse to those of the petitioner. Thus the Court in Glasser
did, indeed, "appraise the quality of the defense" by examining the trial
record and conduding that the attorney's representation of the petitioner
was not effective.1 6
II.

CONDUCT CONSTrrUTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

It is a poorly-kept secret within the legal profession that the adequacy
of representation in our trial courts is below what it ought to be. Chief
Justice Burger has recently stated that "from one-third to one-half of
the lawyers who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified to
render fully adequate representation."' 17 Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has stated
that "a great many-if not most-indigent defendants do not receive the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment."' 8
Despite this recognition that representation of defendants is often inadequate, no definitive standard against which the conduct of attorneys
can be measured has been uniformly adopted. Nevertheless, by examining
the case law one can begin to recognize certain factual situations where it
will usually be found that counsel's representation of defendant was ineffective.
A. Pre-trial Conduct
One of the most successful grounds for overturning a conviction for
ineffective assistance of counsel is the lack of adequate pre-trial preparation or investigation of the case.' 9 The importance to a proper defense

of thorough investigation of the facts and diligent preparation of the
case has been recognized since Powell where the Court stated:
It is not enough to assume that counsel thus precipitated into
the case thought there was no defense, and exercised their best
judgment in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they
and thoroughgoing investinor the court could say what a prompt
20
gation might disclose as to the facts.
Thus where a possible defense can be shown to have existed which the
defendant's attorney did not advance because of lack2 of preparation or

investigation of the facts, a new trial may be ordered. '

16. Id. at 76. See also Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation
as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Case, 59 Nw. U.L. Rr.v. 289,
293 (1965).
17. Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy, Fourth John F. Sonnet Memorial Lecture, Fordham University Law School,
Nov. 26, 1978.
18. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cm. L. RPv. 1, 2

(1973).
19. Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoRN.LL L. Rv. 1077, 1086
(1978).
20. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1982).
21. Brooks v. Texas, 881 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967); Brubaker v. Dickson,
810 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 872 U.S. 978 (1968); Tucker v. United
States, 285 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956); Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166
(W.D. Mo. 1968).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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A failure to investigate the applicable law which results in the neglect
of a legitimate defense may also cause the court to award the defendant
a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 22 This
failure, however, is not easily discerned because an attorney's ignorance
of the law seldom appears in the record. Thus instances of inadequate
investigation of the applicable law most frequently are not discovered
until an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's habeas corpus petition.2
The leading case in this area is People v. Ibarra.24 In this case the defendant's attorney was not acquainted with the rule of law which allowed
a defendant simultaneously to challenge the search's legality while denying
a proprietary interest in the premises entered. The court held that this
failure of the attorney to research the applicable law reduced the trial
to a farce and ordered a new trial. Other cases involving inadequate investigation of the law include In re Williams, 25 where defendant's attorney
did not know the elements of the offense with which the defendant was
charged; Kott v. Green,26 where the attorney was unacquainted with the
rules of admissibility of the defendant's prior confessions; and Wilson v.
Reagan,2 7 where the attorney was unaware that the trial judge had the
authority to sentence the defendant to probation and thus did not request
it.
There are two other categories of cases involving pre-trial attorney
conduct. The first category involves cases where the adequacy of the
attorney's consultations with the defendant is questioned.2 8 The popularity of this claim is at least partially due to the fact that the Supreme
Court in Powell v. Alabama pointed out the importance of adequate consultation. 29 A finding that an attorney's assistance has been ineffective
on this ground must be supported by a showing that adequate consultation
would have led to the discovery of a defense. This was implicitly established by the Supreme Court in the often-criticized decision of Chambers
v. Maroney.3o In Chambers a legal services attorney did not speak to the
defendant until the morning of the defendant's trial. The Court held
that to be entitled to relief a defendant must show how the inadequate
consultation prejudiced his case.
The final category of cases involving pre-trial attorney conduct consists of cases where the defendant has pleaded guilty upon the advice
of his attorney. It has been said that the damaging effects of ineffective
22. Finer, supra note 19.
23. Id.
24. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963); see also Saltys
v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972).
25. 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969).
26. 303 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
27. 354 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1965).
28. Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962); Bentley v. Florida,
285 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
29. 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
30. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/1

4

1976]

Gard: Gard: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel--Standards and Remedies
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

assistance of counsel are extremely great in this area. 31 These claims are
particularly difficult because there are no records kept of a defense attorney's discussions with the prosecuting attorney about possible dispositions of the case. Another complication is that courts are reluctant even
to examine the "plea bargaining" process and generally are unsympathetic
to a defendant's claim that he should have received a lighter sentence.
Therefore, an attorney who engages in plea bargaining on behalf of his
client must possess a high degree of skill both in assessing his client's
chances for acquittal and in the art of negotiating. A lawyer who does
not have these skills risks doing his client great harm.
The Supreme Court has held that a defendant who has pleaded guilty
can attack his conviction on the ground that his guilty plea was not
voluntarily made.3 2 Thus the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
must be directed toward whether the attorney's advice to plead guilty was
so erroneous that the plea was not voluntary.8 3 "The fact that the plea
must be the product of an understanding and uncoerced act inevitably
brings into consideration the caliber of defense counsel's representations."3 4
The two most frequent errors committed by attorneys in the plea bargaining process which have been held to constitute ineffective assistance are
the misrepresentation of an offered agreement with the prosecutor and
advice based upon ignorance of the facts or law of a case.3 5
The courts have consistently held that a general statement by an
attorney such as "the court will be more lenient with you if you plead
guilty" does not constitute a misrepresentation which would render an
otherwise valid guilty plea invalid because it was not voluntarily made.3 6
On the other hand, courts have invalidated convictions because of involuntary guilty pleas where an attorney has made a promise of a specific
disposition of a case without express assurances of such a disposition by
the prosecutor.3 7 In United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi38 the
court stated that a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea where it was
shown that the defendant's attorney promised a suspended sentence but
instead the sentence was for two and one-half to five years. This principle
is not uniformly applied, however. For example, in United States v.
Weese39 the defendant was sentenced to a year and a day in prison. The
court refused to allow the withdrawal of the guilty plea in spite of de31. Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining: What is
the Standard?, 12 DUQUESNE L. Rv. 321 (1973).

32. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
33. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
34. Comment, supra note 31, at 324.

35. Id.; see also Finer, supra note 19.

36. See, e.g., Thomson v. Huff, 149 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
37. State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165 (1968); see also Note,

Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise By Prosecutions to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 865, 890 (1964).
38. 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
39. 145 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1944).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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fendant's contention that his attorney had assured him that he would
receive a suspended sentence.
Another error made by attorneys which often leads courts to invalidate guilty pleas is advising a client to plead guilty without an adequate
understanding of the law or facts involved in the case.40 Thus where an
attorney advised his client to plead guilty to a forgery charge but the
defendant could have been prosecuted only for misuse of credit cards
(which carried a lesser penalty), ineffective assistance was found. 41 Similarly, where a defendant's attorney overestimated the possible sentence the
defendant might receive if he did not plead guilty by a factor of six,
42
ineffective assistance was found.
Defendant may also seek to withdraw his guilty plea in other types
of cases involving erroneous attorney advice. In United States ex rel.
Scott v. Mancusi 43 the court refused to find ineffective assistance of counsel
in spite of an attorney's erroneous advice that his client could withdraw
a guilty plea unilaterally-state law requiring the trial judge's approval
of such withdrawal.
B. Trial Conduct
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involving attorney conduct
at the trial itself are perhaps the most frequently made and tie least
successful of all ineffective assistance claims. 44 Courts are extremely reluctant to second-guess an attorney's motives for doing or not doing
something at trial and usually dismiss these claims unless there appears
to be no reasonable justification for the attorney's acts. For example, in
Williams v. Beto45 the defendant's attorney did not make any objections
during the entire trial. The court dismissed this as a "trial tactic" observing that there was little objectionable material in the record and "he
who often objects, only to have his objections over-ruled, risks alienating
the jury."46 In Barba-Reyes v. United States47 the defendant was found
with ninety pounds of marijuana under the back seat of his car by a
customs agent. His attorney did not file a motion to suppress even though
the car was searched without a warrant seventy miles north of the Mexi40. Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
41. In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969).
42. Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1972). In this case the
defendant's attorney agreed to advise his client to plead guilty in return for the
prosecutor dropping five counts of a six-count indictment. However, the five
counts dropped were dearly invalid and unenforceable and the defendant pleaded
guilty to the one valid count.
43. 429 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1970).
44. Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78
HARv. L. RFzv. 1435 (1965). See also United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515,
529 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), afjrd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873
(1957); Bowen v. United States, 192 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 943 (1952); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531,
1536 (1963).
45. 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
46. Id. at 703.
47. 387 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/1
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can border. The court said that this was a "trial tactic" and it "decline[d]
to indulge in speculation in an effort to make plain that which is not
48
discernible in the record."
Because of the small amount of information which can be gathered
from a trial record, most courts will not question tactical decisions made
by a defendant's attorney as long as there might be a rational reason for
his decision. 4 9 Thus courts have overlooked the absence of an opening
statement because the attorney might not have wanted to commit himself
to a particular defense 50 and have overlooked the absence of cross-examination of witnesses because there was no indication that it clearly would
have been advantageous. 51
In cases where the performance of the attorney at trial is consistently
poor and this fact is amply demonstrated by the available record, the
courts have found that defendants have been deprived of effective assistance
52
of counsel. An example of this situation is found in People v. DeSimone.
In this case the defendants' appointed attorney told the jurors during
voir dire that the defense had the burden of proving the defendants were
insane at the time of the murder. The attorney elicited testimony from
witnesses at trial which tended to show the sanity of the defendants, and
the judge had to stop the attorney from introducing documentary proof
of sanity. The attorney was unable to formulate a proper hypothetical
question for a psychiatrist, so he gave up. In addition, he made no objections throughout a 2,250 page record despite the introduction of much
inadmissible evidence including statements made by the defendants. Finally, the attorney informed the jury, both during voir dire and opening
statement, of numerous prior arrests of the defendants.
Two other examples of attorney conduct at trial clearly constituting
ineffective assistance of counsel are Brooks v. Texas5 s and United States
v. Burks.5 4 In Brooks, because of overwhelming evidence of guilt, the

defendant's only possible defense was insanity. Defendant had been civilly
committed at least three times in the two years immediately preceeding
the crime, and he had twice attempted suicide during that period. The
prosecutor had the defendant examined by a psychiatrist and the report
of this examination contained much information which would have tended
to establish insanity. Despite all this, however, the defendant's attorney
did not raise insanity as a defense. In addition, the attorney allowed
the defendant to be tried while handcuffed and in his jail uniform. In
48. Id. at 93.
49. Note, Effective *Assistanceof Counsel, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531 (1963); see also
United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 809 (1949).
50. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
51: Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962); Mitchell v.
United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
52. 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).

53. 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
54. 470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Burks the defendant's attorney failed to seek discovery under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 16 (a), could not tell the difference between impeaching
a witness by a prior statement and refreshing his recollection, and tried
to introduce defense exhibits during the prosecution's case. Also, the
attorney did not know how to introduce character evidence and did not
request instructions to the jury as to lesser included offenses as he thought
the judge would automatically include these instructions.
Most ineffective assistance cases are not so clear-cut. An attorney may
make only one or two errors or engage in questionable trial tactics or
the record may be insufficient to determine just what he did or why. As
a result most cases are decided on the particular facts involved. Nevertheless, over the last forty years trends in the area of ineffective assistance
of counsel involving trial conduct have emerged.
Where blacks have been systematically excluded from a black defendant's jury and no challenge is made to the jury's composition,5 5
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have been upheld. No independent showing of prejudice need be made since a presumption of prejudice appears to be applied. The reasons for the more favorable treatment
of these particular claims are not articulated by the courts. Possible explanations might be the historical deference which courts have given to
attempts to counter racial discrimination and the reluctance of appointed
counsel to antagonize a trial judge by challenging the racial composition
of a jury.
Another area of trial conduct where claims of ineffective assistance
have been successfully raised encompasses cases where the attorney fails
to object to clearly inadmissible and prejudicial testimony.50 If such claims
are to be successful the defendant must be able to demonstrate both
the inadmissibility of the evidence and substantial prejudice flowing from
its admission. In People v. Blevins57 two inexperienced defense attorneys
were pitted against an experienced prosecutor and his three privatelyretained assistants. As a result the prosecutors succeeded in getting the
defendant to admit his participation in two prior crimes although no
convictions resulted therefrom. The Illinois appellate court admonished
the trial judge for not cutting off this questioning and ordered a new
trial.
A third category of ineffective assistance claims involves cross-examination of witnesses at trial. Although the failure of an attorney to crossexamine witnesses has never been found to be ineffective assistance itself,58
one court has said that it is one factor which may be looked at in con55. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959).
56. Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1963); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1963).
57. 251 Ill. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911).
58. Finer, supra note 19.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/1
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junction with other factors. 59 However, where a defense attorney damages
his client through his own cross-examination, a claim of ineffective assistance will be upheld. In People v. Nitti6O a mother and her son were
tried for the murder of the mother's husband. At trial the mother's
attorney asked one of her other sons on cross-examination whether he
loved his mother. When he answered in the negative and the attorney
further inquired why, the boy replied, "because she killed my father."8 1.
Despite the repeated efforts of the trial judge to caution the defendant's
attorney, more damaging testimony was elicited on cross-examination. The
Illinois Supreme Court found itself compelled to order a new trial for
the defendants as a result of their attorney's ineffective assistance.
In another Illinois case 62 in which ineffective assistance was found
the defense attorney allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant
as to alleged fraud in business dealings, abandonment of his family, and
an adulterous relationship. The court noted that the cross-examination
covered thirty pages of trial transcript and at least half the examination.
was irrelevant to the charge of manslaughter on which the defendant was
being tried.
Unlike the failure to make an opening statement,63 the failure to make
a dosing argument or making one which is clearly perfunctory has been
found to constitute ineffective assistance.64 The rationale for this difference appears to be that there is no logical reason for waiving closing
argument. As in the failure to challenge the racial composition of the
jury, a presumption of prejudice appears to be applied. This presumption
seems justified by the difficulty the defendant would have in trying to
establish prejudice to his case from the attorney's omission.
A fifth type of trial conduct where claims of ineffective assistance
are often made and upheld is the failure of the defendant's attorney to
request jury instructions to which the defendant is entitled. 65 In Banks
v. United States,66 the defendant was tried for the purchase of heroin.
He contended, however, that the "buy" was made at the urging of federal
narcotics agents and was made with money supplied by them. His attorney
advised him to admit making the purchase, but he failed*to 'request an
instruction on entrapment. The court held this to be ineffective assistance.
However, this is another area, in which the "trial tactics" doctrine is
used by the courts to deny relief to petitioners. In State v. Fulford67
there was no ineffective assistance of counsel found where, in a trial for,
59. United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
60. 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924).
61l.
1d; -at 453.
62, People v. Gardiner, 803 Ill. 204, 185 N.E. 422 '(1922).
63. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
64. Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Johns v,

Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
65. People v. Georgev, 38 Ill. 2d 165, 230 N.E.2d 851 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 998 (1968).
66. 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 886 (1958).
67. 290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W.2d 270 (1971).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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second-degree murder, the defendant's attorney requested a self-defense
instruction and thereby waived a "heat of passion" instruction which
might have reduced the conviction to manslaughter. 68 The court said
that the attorney had made a rational tactical decision to try to get his
client acquitted completely.
A final area where courts have found the acts of defense attorneys
at trial to constitute ineffective assistance encompasses claims where the
attorney represents interests which conflict with those of his client. This
most frequently occurs where two or more persons are being tried for
a certain crime and are being represented by the same attorney. 09 If one
defendant has made statements implicating another defendant in the crime,

the attorney is representing conflicting interests. 70 The Supreme Court
has recently eliminated the presumption of prejudice in this area and
now requires the defendant to show how his attorney's conflict of interest

has prejudiced his case-at least in cases where the defendant has pleaded
guilty.7 ' This seems to be an unduly harsh burden for the defendant to
bear in a situation where his attorney should not have undertaken his
72
defense in the first place.

C. Post-Trial Conduct
Claims of ineffective assistance involving post-trial attorney conduct
which are frequently made and upheld concern the defense attorney's
failure to exercise the defendant's right to appeal. It most often arises
where the attorney fails to inform his client of his right to appeal a
conviction 73 or where the client instructs his attorney to appeal the case
but the attorney fails to follow his client's instructions. 74 A less frequent
claim is that the attorney informed his client of his right to appeal and
did try to file an appeal but was incapable of following the correct appellate procedure. This was the case in State v. Thomas,7 5 where the attorney
failed to assign grounds in a motion for a new trial and failed to file a
timely notice of appeal, and in McAuliffe v. Rutledge,76 where the appeal
was dismissed because the attorney failed to obtain an extension of time
for filing the trial transcript with the appellate court. It has been argued
68. Although the court is required to give general instructions on the issues
without request from counsel, attorneys are often expected to request instructions favorable to their client, particularly where there has been little or no
evidence presented on the issue raised by the proposed instruction. See Annot.,
56 A.L.R.2d 1170 (1957) on the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on
the issue of self-defense.
69, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
70. Id.
71. Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972); but see Ray v. Rose, 491 F.2d
285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
72. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R-SPONSIBILITY, Canon 5, EC 5-15 states: "A
lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests..."
73. Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
74. Coffman v. Bomar, 220 F. Supp. 343 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
75. 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
76. 231 Ga. 745, 204 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/1
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that a new trial is unnecessary in these cases and that all that is needed
is a rule which will permit the appellate courts to hear the defendant's
appeal.77 Such a view seems reasonable as long as provision is made for
the appointment of a different attorney to represent the defendant on his
appeal.
D. General Competence of the Attorney
In cases involving claims of ineffective assistance the courts' concern
is with the quality of assistance provided in the case at issue and not with
the overall competence of the attorney. This seems to be the reason why
courts are not at all receptive to allegations of ineffectiveness because

of the physical or mental condition of the attorney in question. Those
petitioners who allege ineffective assistance based merely on the physical
or mental condition of their attorney seem to confuse the "effective assistance of counsel" with the "assistance of effective counsel." Thus
courts routinely deny relief to petitioners who claim that their attorneys
were too young,78 were mentally unbalanced,O were addicted to narcotics, 8 0 were physically ill,81 or were intoxicated during the trial.82

In Hudspeth v. McDonald8s the court stated:
The most that can be said for this testimony is that it establishes
that appellee's counsel drank throughout the trial and that he
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a greater or
lesser degree during the whole trial. But what of it? Appellee employed him; he paid him a substantial fee, and had a right to his
services if he desired them, even though he might have been under
the influence of intoxicants.8 4
III. STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
The predominant reason the courts have been unable to reach consistent results in the area of ineffective assistance is the lack of a workable standard by which to measure the conduct of defense attorneys. Only
in the past ten years have the courts attempted to remedy this problem
by defining just what does and does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. For many years after Powell v. Alabama85 courts either did
not apply any standard in assessing an attorney's performance or applied
a standard phrased in fourteenth amendment "due process" terms of a
77. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973).

78. Spaulding v. United States, 279 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
887 (1960); see also Comment, Quality of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 8 Amut. L.

REv. 484 (1954).

79. Hagan v. United States, 9 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1925).
80. United States v. Butler, 167 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff'd 260 F.2d
574 (4th Cir. 1958).
81. People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App. 2d 864, 324 P.2d 981 (2d Dist. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 19 Cal. App. 3d 102, 96 Cal. Rptr. 330 (2d Dist. 1971).
82. People v. Gourdin, 108 Cal. App. 333, 291 P. 701 (2d Dist. 1930).
83. 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941).
84. Id. at 967.

85. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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deprivation of a fair trial.8 6 The Supreme Court used such a standard in
Betts v. Bradys7 where it stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the
common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right." 88 This vague test
is still in use in some jurisdictions today, but most have abandoned it
for other tests.8 9

After the "fair trial" standard was abandoned, most courts moved
to the rule that counsel has provided ineffective assistance if his representation was such "as to make the trial a farce, a sham or a mockery of
justice." 90 This standard imposes a heavy burden on defendants and seems
somewhat inconsistent with Betts v. Brady because a trial may be unfair
yet not be farcical. It is also a vague test which can be and which has
been applied inconsistently by the courts. This results partly from the
fact that courts applying the "farce and mockery" test do not apply it

literally.9 1 For these reasons and others, this standard has been uniformly
criticized by the commentators. One commentator has stated that this
standard "seem[s] to be utilized as appropriate language, though largely
devoid of substance, so as to rationalize the result rather than as a basis
of reaching the result."92 Similarly, another has noted that "really these
are not standards at all. They are so much circular verbiage designed
to conceal the completely subjective determinations made by the reviewing courts." 93 Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit
has simply stated that this standard "is itself a mockery of the sixth
94
amendment."
Efforts by the courts to clarify the "farce and mockery" standard have
not succeeded. One proposed "clarification" is "the presence or absence
86. People v. Nowak, 372 I1. 391, 24 N.E.2d 50 (1939); State v. Keller,
57 N.D. 645, 223 N.W. 698 (1929).
87. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
88. Id. at 473.
89. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 496 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973),
where the court stated that "[t]he ultimate test is whether the efforts and representation of the attorney have reached a level of adequacy so that the defendant
has had a 'fair trial' . . ."

90. Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting Palmer, Incompe-

tency and Inadequacy of Counsel as a Basis for Relief in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 20 Sw. L.J. 136, 138 (1966).
91. See, e.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
Stringent as the 'mockery of justice' standard may seem, we have
never intended it to be used as a shibboleth to avoid a searching evaluation of possible constitutional violations; nor has it been so used in this
circuit. It was not intended that the 'mockery of justice' standard be
taken literally, but rather that it be employed as an embodiment of the
principle that a petitioner must shoulder a heavy burden in proving
unfairness.
Id. at 214. See also United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1974).
92. Note, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. Riv. 299, 300 (1973).
93. Lee, Right to Effective Counsel: A Judicial Huristic, 2 AM. J. Cams. L.
277, 289 (1974).
94. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIr. L. REv. 1, 28
(1973).
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of judicial character in the proceedings as a whole." 95 Another is "a

total failure to present the defendant's cause in any fundamental respect." 98
A third "clarification" is "that which amounts to no representation at
all." 97 It can be readily seen that these are not improvements on the
"farce and mockery" standard either from the standpoint of clarity or
of constitutionality.
Recently many courts have reacted to this criticism by abandoning
the "farce and mockery" standard. 98 They have been largely left without
the guidance of the Supreme Court in this endeavor. A test which was
first developed by the Fifth Circuit in 1961 is "counsel reasonably likely
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance." 99 This test has
recently been adopted by the Sixth Circuit,1 00 Ninth Circuit,10 ' and
the California state courts. 102 The District of Columbia Circuit also has
adopted a very similar standard. Thus in United States v. DeCoster'0 3
it was stated that: "[a] defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent
assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate."'104
This test was supplemented by guidelines setting forth some of the duties
owed by counsel to his client. 10 5 Although the "reasonableness" test is
constitutionally an improvement over the "farce and mockery" standard,
it is still too vague to provide the courts with sufficient guidance or to
lead to more consistent results.
An improvement on the Fifth Circuit test was first announced by
the Third Circuit in Moore v. United States.'0 6 That court stated that
"the ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his
counsel's act or omission, but whether counsel's performance was at the
level of normal competency."' 10 7 This test would compare an attorney's
performance with that of other attorneys, thus introducing the tort concepts of due care, community standards, and customary skill and knowl95. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945).
96. Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
97. Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
98. This standard has not been totally abandoned by the federal courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1974); Moran v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220
(1st Cir. 1974); Johnson v. United States, 485 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1973). With
Moran compare Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1003 (1975), and Karger v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 595 (D. Mass. 1975).
99. McKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
877 (1961). See also Bursten v. Caldwell, 506 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973).
100. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
101. United States v. Elksnis, 528 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975).
102. People v. Strawder, 34 Cal. App. 3d 370, 108 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1973).

103. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203-4.
432 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir 1970).
Id. at 737. See also United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225 (3rd Cir. 1972),
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edge. 108 It is a radical departure from the earlier tests as it focuses directly
on the attorney's performance. 109 It further presumes that a defendant
who was represented by an attorney who was negligent (in the tort sense
of that word) cannot have had a fair trial. This test has received critical
approval and has been adopted by several state courts with certain improvements."1 0 The most significant improvement is the addition of the
words "of criminal lawyers." This improvement assures that an attorney
must perform at the level of the reasonably competent criminal lawyer"'l
and places a greater burden on newly admitted bar members and on
"office practitioners" who are appointed to represent indigent defendants.
The most specific standard which has been adopted to replace the
"farce and mockery" test is based upon the American Bar Association
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice."1 2 It lists

specific duties and guidelines for defense attorneys. These guidelines provide that:
(1) an attorney must confer with his client as early as possible
and as often as necessary,
(2) he must advise his client of the charges against him and of
his rights,

(3) he must ascertain and develop all appropriate defenses,
(4) he must conduct all necessary investigations, and
(5) he must allow time for reflection and preparation."18
They have been adopted as a minimum standard for effective assistance
of counsel in three jurisdictions. The Fourth Circuit was the first jurisdiction to adopt them."14 Its lead was followed by the District of Columbia Gircuit1

5

and by the Wisconsin Supreme Court."16 A standard based

on specifically outlined duties and guidelines is not only more fair to
the defendant but is also more fair to the defense attorneys who are on
notice as to what they must do to avoid successful attacks on their assistance. In addition, it incorporates much of the existing case law and
puts it in a framework that will provide more consistent results than
those obtained under other tests.
The use of a court-fashioned standard to determine whether counsel
has provided defendant with inadequate assistance implies that not all
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1978).
108. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
109. The test adopted by the Seventh Circuit is somewhat similar. In United
States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975), the court
stated: "We now hold that the constitution guarantees a criminal defendant
legal assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional representation."
110. Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077 (1978).
111. Jackson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 537 P.2d 473 (Nev. 1975);
State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 222 N.W.2d 578 (1974); State v. Thomas,
203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
112. ABA STANDARDS, TUE DEFENSE FuNCrION (1971).
113. Id.
114. Coles v. Peyton, 889 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 893 U.S. 849 (1968).
115. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See notes 103105 and accompanying text supra.
116. State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 548, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1978).
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errors made by defense counsel render his aid so ineffective as to violate
defendant's constitutional rights.11 7 Because the right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution, one might argue that
the state should have the burden of proving that any errors committed
by defendant's counsel were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.118 This
would require a showing that the error did not contribute to defendant's
conviction. However, no court initially places this burden on the state.
Instead courts require that defendant show that any errors committed
resulted in counsel's performance falling below the standard for effective assistance in that jurisdiction. In addition, many courts require that
defendant show that his attorney's errors substantially prejudiced the
outcome of his case. 119 In McQueen v. Swenson 120 the Eighth Circuit
stated that a two-step process should be employed in evaluating claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the court must determine whether
counsel has failed to perform some essential duty owed to his client.
In making this determination the stage of the process where the error
occurred must be considered. Second, the court must determine whether
21
counsel's failure resulted in prejudice to the criminal defendant.
In most jurisdictions the standard of performance required of attorneys in plea bargaining situations is the same as that required in trial
situations. 122 A few courts, however, have imposed different (and less
stringent) standards on an attorney involved in plea bargaining for his
client. 128 In Lamb v. Beto12 4 the Fifth Circuit held that the only duty of
an attorney in guilty plea situations is to ascertain whether the plea is
entered voluntarily and knowingly. In Winters v. Cook1 25 the district
court said that "more is required of an attorney where the plea is not
28
guilty and the case goes to trial than in the case of a guilty plea."'
In McMann v. Richardson 27 the Supreme Court adopted its own standard
for guilty plea cases. This standard bears a resemblance to the Third
117. Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78
HARv. L. REv. 1434 (1965).
118. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.s. 85 (1963).
119. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Re,
336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1964); Taylor v. United States, 332 F.2d 918 (8th Cir.
1964); Mace v. State, 452 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. 1970).
120. 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
121. Baylard, Ineffectiveness of Counsel-The Duty to Make a Reasonable
PretrialInvestigation, 40 Mo. L. REv. 369 (1975).
122. Burnside v. Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Neb. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 451 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1971); Morris v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1016
(N.D. Ga. 1970). See also Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Barganing: What is the Standard?, 12 DUQUESNE L. Rv. 321 (1973).
123. Missouri appears to apply a different test in the case of guilty pleas.
State v. Garrett, 510 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
124. 423 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1970).
125. 333 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Miss. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d
1393 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).
126. Id. at 1041.
127. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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Circuit standard which is derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 299A. The Court described this standard in McMann as follows:
whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent, and, therefore, vulnerable . . . depends as an initial matter, not on whether a court
would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or
wrong, but on whether that advice was within the 128
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
The Court thus recognized that competent advice is necessary for a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision,
the Second Circuit, exhibiting its traditional hostility towards claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, added as a requirement of reversal in
cases involving a guilty plea that defendant show that he would not have

pleaded guilty if the erroneous advice had not been given.1 29 This holding not only removes the focus of attention from the attorney's conduct,
but it also ignores the basic fact that a defendant in a criminal case
is wholly dependent on his attorney. He is incapable of making reasonable
judgments unless he is competently advised.' 3 0 Fortunately, other courts
have not followed the Second Circuit in adding this requirement.
Until recently claims of ineffective assistance in the case of a privately retained lawyer were seldom successful. Two basic theories were
employed to defeat these claims. The first theory used to deny relief
stated that because the attorney is the defendant's agent, the defendant
is bound by the acts and omissions of his counsel. 31' The second theory
denied relief on the grounds that there has been no state action which
has deprived the defendant of a fair trial.' 3 2 According to the second
theory, state action is only present where a responsible official of the
state such as the judge, prosecutor, or other law enforcement officer is
connected with the rejection or interference with the defendant's right
128. Id. at 771.
129. United States v. Welton, 439 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1971).
130. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
131. Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ind. 1955); Prince v.
State, 461 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); People v. Fryson, 36 Misc. 2d 73,
232 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
This theory has been attacked on the basis that if an attorney cannot waive
his client's right to a fair trial, he cannot waive his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1952). Therefore, the
defendant should not be bound by any acts or omissions of the attorney which
rise to the level of ineffective assistance. Another criticism of this theory is that
it is grossly unfair. As one commentator has pointed out:
[Tihe agency theory . . . hardly seems consistent with contemporary
constitutional doctrine which holds that no unrepresented defendant can
be presumed to have received a fair trial because of the complexity of
criminal law and because of the psychological anxiety of being in
jeopardy.
Flynn, Adequacy of Counsel: The Emerging Fair Trial Issue for the Seventies?,
14 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19 (1975).
132. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1953); United States ex rel.
Wilkins v. Banmiller, 205 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1962); People v. Hernandez,
8 N.Y.2d 345, 170 N.E.2d 673, 207 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1960).
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to assistance of counsel. 133 This theory has been used to defeat claims
of ineffective assistance in the case of both a retained and appointed attorney. 13 4 However, it poses greater difficulty in the case of a retained
attorney because a presumption that a privately-retained attorney has
protected his client's rights is applied. 18 5 The state action theory fails to
recognize that state action is present simply because the state is the agency
responsible for the trial and incarceration of the defendant. Since only
the government can conduct criminal prosecutions, state action exists if
during the prosecution the defendant is denied his rights to due process
and effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the fourteenth and sixth
amendments. These theories are of decreasing importance, however, because a growing majority of courts now treat ineffective assistance claims
involving retained counsel and appointed counsel alike. 138
IV.

REMEDYING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

A. Retrospective Remedies
There are two general categories of remedies for ineffective assistance
claims. The first category consists of those actions which an aggrieved
defendant, himself, might take. Within this category are three "retrospective" remedies. Defendant may attempt to have his conviction overturned
on the grounds of ineffective assistance, he may sue his lawyer for malpractice, or he may ask that the ABA institute disciplinary proceedings
against his attorney. All of these actions have serious limitations. The
latter two remedies, especially, are of limited use because they do not
accomplish defendant's fundamental objective-they fail to provide him
with a new trial.
The weaknesses of the first remedy are obvious. Before defendant's
conviction will be reversed on the grounds of ineffective assistance he
must first show that his attorney's conduct fell below the required standard
of performance and that this fact substantially prejudiced his case. Defendant also must show that his attorney's errors were made from ignorance
and not as some form of "trial tactics." This places a burden on defendants
which many will be unable to meet. In addition, because the burden is
on the defendant to initiate this proceeding, many defendants who are
entitled to a new trial but who are ignorant of this fact will never receive
the benefit of effective counsel.
Two problems with a malpractice suit as a remedy, other than its
failure to provide the defendant with a new trial, are lack of knowledge
133. Malone v. Alabama, 514 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. Tomaselli,
7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E.2d 551, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1960).
134. See cases cited note 133 supra.
135. Malone v. Alabama, 514 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975).
136. See cases cited in Note, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. REv.
299, 312-13 (1973). See also Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1970),

cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002 (1971); United States ex rel. Maselli v. Reincke, 383
F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967); Wilson v. Rose, 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966); Craig v.
United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954); People v. Lathrom, 192 Cal. App. 2d
216, 13 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1961); Abraham v. State, 91 N.E.2d 358 (Ind. 1950).
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of the existence of the remedy and the traditionally hostile attitudes
of courts to malpractice claims. The fact that there are no clear standards
in most jurisdictions by which to measure the attorney's conduct also
is a problem.' 37 As one commentator has noted, "when standards that
dearly articulate counsel's duty to his client are developed, such suits may
become more practical, but whatever it may become, this form of action
is not at all significant now."' 138
The third remedy, disciplinary action by the ABA, also has significant
weaknesses. First, as with the other remedies, clients may not be aware
of it; they may not know about the existence of the ABA or its functions. Second, the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice'3 9 are purely advisory. In any disciplinary proceeding only

,the vague guidelines of Canons 6 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility will be applied. Even where the Canons clearly have been
violated, the courts are often extremely lenient with the offending attorneys. For example, in the case of In re Eldredge'40 a member of the
Missouri bar admitted violating an ABA disciplinary rule. The attorney
had been appointed by the Eighth Circuit to represent a defendant on
a habeas corpus appeal. However, he had failed to file a timely brief,
failed to give the defendant a copy of it when the defendant asked for
one, failed to file a petition for certiorari with the supreme court, and
failed to meet with the defendant or answer the defendant's letters. The
Eighth Circuit struck the attorney's name from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice before it. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to do
more than issue a reprimand. This case demonstrates that even though
this remedy is theoretically available, it may not lead to the desired result.' 4 ' In addition, even if strong action is taken, the defendant has
received no benefit.
B. PROSPECTIVE REMEDIES
Included in the second category of remedies for ineffective assistance
claims are prospective actions which the courts and society might take
to reduce the incidence of inadequate representation and to increase the
consistency and equity of results reached. The first such remedy is to
change the rules of law applied in proceedings attacking convictions based
upon ineffective assistance of counsel. Such changes not only would increase the likelihood that defendant has had a fair trial but also would
act as a deterrent by increasing the frequency of successful claims.
137. Unless a jurisdiction has adopted the "reasonably competent attorney"
test or a test based on specific guidelines, in most malpractice actions an attorney
need only show compliance with the vague standards provided in Canons 6
and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
138. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. GIN. L. REv. 1 (1973).
139. ABA STANDAmns, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971).
140. 530 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
141. This remedy is made even more impractical by the fact that in many
jurisdictions grievances against attorneys are initially investigated by local grievance committees whose members may know the attorney involved.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/1
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One proposed change in the applicable rules of law is to require
the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that no prejudice has resulted
when the defendant has made a prima fade showing of ineffective assistance. 142 This would seem to be the proper course in light of the
143
language of several Supreme Court opinions.
A second proposed change is to alter the standard used in weighing
the effectiveness of an attorney's assistance. One test which has been suggested is "whether counsel exhibited the normal and customary degree
of skill possessed by attorneys who are fairly skilled in the criminal law
and who have a fair amount of experience at the criminal bar."144 While
this standard is a vast improvement over the "farce and mockery" test,
it is too vague to be of any use to the courts or to defense attorneys.
The most serious problem with this test is that it fails to account for
the fact that even the best lawyers sometimes make serious mistakes. Its
use, therefore, would deny relief to the defendant whose brilliant criminal
lawyer forgot to file a motion to suppress evidence or to interview a witness but who otherwise performed adequately.
Another suggested standard is that an attorney's assistance has been
ineffective if "it [is] unlikely that a fair trial could be had in accordance
with the applicable constitutional principles."' 45 This formulation is also
too vague to give the courts any guidance or to give defense attorneys
adequate notice of what will be expected of them. It really only repeats
the holding in Powell v. Alabama that the Constitution guarantees a fair
trial to all defendants, and a fair trial cannot be had unless the defendant
is competently represented.
A standard similar to that adopted first in the Fourth Circuit and
which is based on the ABA guidelines provides the most viable alternative. First, by stating specific duties and providing broader guidelines

it furnishes a set of criteria to the attorney which if followed protects
both the defendant and his attorney. It protects the defendant by assuring him of more adequate representation. The attorney is protected because he can limit his liability and protect his reputation by carefully
adhering to the designated guidelines. A set of guidelines also aids the
courts in evaluating an attorney's performance. This should lead to increased consistency in the results reached by the courts. Finally, this
standard is preferable because it incorporates much of the existing law
in a framework which can be easily amended to accommodate any new
factual situations that arise.
A third proposed change in the applicable rules of law involves the
standards applied in plea bargaining cases. At least two commentators
have stressed the need for a separate standard of performance in these
142.
143.
U.S. 85
144.
145.
(1965).

Bazelon, supra note 138.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
(1963).
Finer, supra note 110, at 1080.
Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student Soldiers, 45 B.U.L. RIv. 445, 460
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cases because of the different nature of problems involved in them. 140
If the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice
are adopted as the applicable standard, no separate standard for guilty
plea cases is needed as the ABA guidelines adequately provide for investigation of the facts and of appropriate defenses. If such a standard is
not adopted, however, a separate standard for plea bargaining cases is
probably necessary. Such a standard should stress the importance of adequately investigating the law and the facts and of accurately informing
the client of the prosecution's position.
To supplement the meager record available to appellate courts it
has also been proposed that the defense attorney write down both his
advice to his client and the reasoning behind it and file it with the court
in a sealed envelope. The contents of the envelope would be read only
if the client later claimed that his attorney's assistance was ineffective.
Obviously defense attorneys will object to the extra work and judicial
interference with their duties. Any disadvantages, however, are outweighed
by the benefits of providing a more fair determination of defendants'
claims and by the ability to actually determine whether those claims are
justified. Defense attorneys should be satisfied that the courts will be
able to say with certainty that the attorney provided effective assistance.
Objection to these proposals might also be made on the ground that such
supplementation would violate the attorney-client privilege. However, a
defendant probably waives this privilege when he attacks his lawyer's
assistance.
A second prospective remedy which has been suggested is improving
the overall quality of criminal lawyers. The most creative method which
has been proposed to accomplish this is to make the practice of criminal
law a state-recognized and certified specialty. Programs of this type have
147
been adopted on a voluntary basis in California and New Mexico.
In California in order to be certified as a specialist in criminal law an
attorney must have practiced for at least five years prior to application.
He must also show participation as principal counsel in a number of
criminal cases, take post-law school coursework in criminal law and procedure, and be examined on this coursework. 148 There are three problems

with this system as it exists at the present time. First, there is a "grandfather clause" which exempts attorneys who have been practicing ten
years or more from the examination and education requirements.149 This
reduces the effectiveness of the system upon older attorneys who may be
in need of "refresher courses" covering recent developments. Second, the
five-year requirement may serve to discourage competent young lawyers
from entering into the practice of criminal law. Finally, because the
system is voluntary, it probably does not reach those lawyers whose as146. Bazelon, supra note 138; Comment, supra note 122.
147. Final Report-Committee on Specialization, 44 CAL. ST. B.J. 493 (1969).
148. Standards for Specialization Announced, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 80, 82-3 (1973).
149. Id. at 81-2.
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sistance to their clients is inadequate. If such a system of specialization
is made mandatory and if it does not contain a "grandfather clause,"
it will probably raise the overall quality of defense counsel and significantly reduce the incidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. Lawyers will
still make mistakes, but they will probably occur with less frequency.
There have been several other proposals made which would improve
the overall quality of practicing criminal lawyers. It has been suggested
that only lawyers with a certain amount of experience in criminal law
be appointed in felony cases.1 50 There are two problems with this suggestion besides the obvious one that it cannot apply to privately-retained
counsel. First, it does nothing to eliminate incompetent lawyers or to
provide them with additional training and education. In fact such a system probably tends to protect less competent lawyers who have practiced
five years or more. Second, such a system restricts the number of attorneys
practicing criminal law at a time when it is desirable to channel young
lawyers into this area.
Another suggestion which has been made is to provide defense attorneys with a checklist of steps to take when defending a client in a
criminal case. 15 1 The United States District Court in Maryland does
this, and it appears to be a successful experiment. 152 Obviously, if a
standard consisting of specific guidelines is adopted, a special checklist, while still helpful, may provide little additional guidance.
Finally, it has been suggested that the caseloads of attorneys in public
defender offices be limited and that the compensation paid to appointed
counsel be increased-with no limits on the amount paid for any case.' 53
These proposals should be considered seriously because they will encourage
lawyers to spend more time on their appointed cases and will make the
field of criminal law more attractive.
V. CONCLUSION

In the past the appellate courts have been reluctant to develop clear
standards of performance for defense attorneys and have tended to gloss
over contradictions and inconsistencies in the law of effective assistance
of counsel.' 54 There are many reasons for this reluctance. One reason
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in Foster v. Illinois' 55 is that if claims
of ineffective assistance are too readily upheld, a "flood" of "criminals"
will be turned loose upon the public. Other courts have expressed the
fear that recognition of these claims will cause deliberate ineffective
150. Finer, supra note 110. See also LA. STAT. ANN. Title 15 § 141 (1967) (Assigned counsel in capital cases must have had five years experience at the bar.).
151. Finer, supra note 110.
152.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrED STATES: REPORT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

ACT, 36 F.R.D. 277, 338 (1965).
153. Finer, supra note 110.
154. Bazelon, supra note 138, at 21.
155. 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
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assistance to be rendered by attorneys who have an otherwise weak case.1 56
A third reason is the recognition that ineffective assistance claims may
injure many attorneys' reputations and, as a corollary, will make it harder
to find attorneys willing to accept criminal appointments. 5 7 Another
cause for this reluctance is the possibility that recognition of these claims
will result in an upsurge in caseloads of already overburdened appellate
courts.158 Chief Judge Bazelon has suggested a fifth reason which, if
it is true, creates grave doubts about the "justice" of our criminal justice
system. He states:
It is the belief-rarely articulated; but, I am afraid, widely heldthat most criminal defendants are guilty anyway. From this
assumption it is a short path to the conclusion that the quality
of representation is of small account. 59
In reply to these concerns it may be said that the courts are capable
of weeding out claims which have no merit. Unsuccessful claims need
not damage an attorney's reputation. If an attorney's reputation is damaged because he actually did provide ineffective assistance, that is a small
price to pay for the ability of the defendant to receive a fair trial. In
addition, the competence of the attorney is not questioned by these claims.
What is at issue is the ineffective assistance of counsel in a particular
case-not the assistance of ineffective counsel. Regarding judicial economy,
an upsurge of claims in the appellate courts, if successful, might prompt
the courts to consider guidelines to insure effective assistance. Thus fewer
cases would have to be retried. Finally, regardless of the likelihood that a
defendant will be convicted even with effective representation, our judicial system requires that he receive a fair trial. No policy consideration
such as judicial economy should be used to justify depriving the defendant
of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
The outlook for future development of the law in this area in the
Supreme Court is not heartening. This is partially due to the Court's
reluctance to hear cases involving ineffective assistance claims. In one
recent case a claim of ineffective assistance was the primary issue presented in the briefs and at oral argument. Nevertheless, the Court's
opinion dealt almost exclusively with a subsidiary search and seizure
issue.' 60 In another case, Ray v. Rose.,' 6 ' defendant claimed that he had
156. Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968); Norman v. United
States, 100 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 660 (1939).
157. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); Gray v. United States,
299 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Many courts take steps to protect the attorney's
reputation. Thus in United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 904 (1964), the court referred to the attorney as "Mr. Z" in oral argument and in its opinion.
158. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 850 (1958).
159. Bazelon, supra note 138, at 26.
160. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); see also Bazelon, supra note
138, at 21.
161. 491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
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been coerced into pleading guilty by his attorney. The Sixth Circuit
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing but did not require Ray
to show prejudice to his case stemming from his lawyer's alleged conflict of interest. Despite the fact that the Sixth Circuit's decision directly
contradicted a previous decision of the Court,162 the Supreme Court
refused to grant certiorari. In cases where ineffective assistance claims
have been addressed there is no indication that the Supreme Court will
reverse the requirement of many courts of making the defendant show
prejudice after he has established serious errors on the part of his attorney. In fact the Court has upheld this practice in two cases. 163 There
also appears to be little hope that the Court will fashion a definitive
standard of performance for defense attorneys. In United States v. Badalamente' 64 the Second Circuit denied the defendant's habeas corpus petition
which claimed that defendant had not been adequately represented.
In doing so the court applied the "farce and mockery" test. The Supreme
Court denied the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari despite his
contention that the "farce and mockery" test was inconsistent with the
tests used in the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits, and the test
adopted in McMann 65 by the Supreme Court itself.
In the state courts and lower federal courts the trends are encouraging. The majority of jurisdictions appear to be abandoning the distinction

between privately-retained and appointed attorneys. They also appear to
be moving away from the "farce and mockery" standard of ineffective
assistance and toward the Third and Fourth Circuit tests.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have never been a favorite
of the legal profession. For this reason the law in the field has been
developed on a largely ad hoc basis with few guidelines for either the
courts or defense attorneys to follow. Many suggested changes in the
present system have been proposed, and most of these have some merit.
They cannot be adopted, however, without decisive action by the courts,
the bar, and the state legislatures. If these changes are adopted, both
the legal system and the legal profession will benefit by the higher level
of representation which will be available in our criminal courts and by
the enhanced public image of lawyers which will result.

162.
163.
164.
165.
panying

Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972).
Id.; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
507 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1565 (1975).
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See note 128 and accomtext supra.
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